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FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS-
COMPELLED PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)
United States v. Kasmir, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)
During its last session the Supreme Court ruled on
three cases involving challenges to court ordered
summonses for the production of documents in
criminal investigations. In two of the cases the
petitioners argued that the compulsion to produce the
summoned documents would violate their fifth
amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. In the third case the Court addressed
the issue of whether the respondent had a sufficient
fourth amendment interest in the summoned docu-
ments to challenge the validity of a subpoena diices
tecum. While the two former cases raise a different
constitutional question from the latter, all three cases
serve to definitively outline the limits of future
challenges to the compelled production of documents
in criminal investigations.
In Fisher v. United States' and its companion
case, United States v. Kasmir, the Court ruled that a
summons directing an attorney to produce documents
delivered to the attorney by his client is enforceable
over claims that compliance with the summons
would create a violation of both the client's fifth
amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination and his right to communicate in
confidence with his attorney.
In Fisher, a Special Agent of the Internal Revenue
Service was assigned to investigate the tax liability of
husband and wife taxpayers. When the taxpayers
learned that the Agent wished to interview them
concerning possible civil or criminal liability under
the federal income tax laws they retained Fisher, an
attorney, to represent them. Soon thereafter the
taxpayers obtained from their accountant documents
pertaining to their income tax returns. A few weeks
after receipt of the records the taxpayers turned them
over to Fisher for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice and for Fisher's use in representing them.
Approximately three and one half months later the
Internal Revenue Service served a subpoena duces
tecum 2 on Fisher directing him to give testimony
1425 U.S. 391 (1976).
2The Internal Revenue Service is empowered to issue
subpoenas duces tecum by federal statute. The Internal
relating to the tax liability of the respondents and to
bring the respondents' tax records with him. Fisher
appeared with the records, in response to the sum-
mons, but he refused to allow their inspection by the
Internal Revenue Service. An enforcement action
was commenced by the governmentand the taxpay-
er respondents were permitted to intervene. " To-
gether with Fisher they contended that since the
production of the documents would violate the
taxpayers' fifth amendment right against compelled
self-incrimination, counsel for the taxpayers could
decline to disclose the summoned materials on the
basis of the attorney-client privilege.
Revenue Code provides:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of
any return, making a return where none has been
made, determining the liability of any person for any
internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity
of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect
of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such
liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or
other data which may be relevant or material to
such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or
required to perform the act, or any officer or
employee of such person, or any person having
possession, custody, or care of books of account
containing entries relating to the business of the
person liable for tax or required to perform the act,
or any other person the Secretary or his delegate
may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or
his delegate at a time and place named in the
summons and to produce such books, papers,
records, or other data, and to give such testimony,
under oath, as may be relevant or material to such
inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person con-
cerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material
to such inquiry.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 7602.
3The Internal Revenue Service can enforce a summons
by filing a motion for enforcement in the United States
district court. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 7604(a).
4The taxpayers were permitted to intervene in the
enforcement action pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
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The district court ordered the summons to be
enforced' on the ground that the documents were
owned by the accountant, but it stayed the order
pending appeal. The court reasoned that since the
summoned documents were the work papers of the
accountant they were his property; if the papers had
remained in the accountant's possession he could
have been required to produce the papers pursuant to
a subpoena duces tecum. 6 On the other hand, the
taxpayers could successfully assert their fifth amend-
ment privilege only if they either owned or right-
fully possessed the papers. The court concluded that
since the taxpayers had obtained the papers and
transferred them to their attorney to thwart the gov-
ernment investigation, the taxpayers failed to estab-
lish the requisite possessory interest to withhold pro-
duction of the papers on the basis of the fifth amend-
ment privilege. ' The Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals' affirmed the enforcement order, agreeing that
the taxpayers had never acquired the requisite pos-
sessory interest in the documents and that the rec-
ords, whether they were in the taxpayers' or the
lawyer's custody, were not protected by the fifth
amendment. '
5United States v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa.
1972).
6The district court wrote:
The facts in the instant case . . . demonstrate that the
papers were and are the property of the accountant.
They only left his possession after the taxpayer
learned of the investigation. The transfer of the papers
seems to indicate that this was an attempt to thwart
the government's investigation. Of course, there is no
attorney-client privilege which could be claimed
since the accountant's transfer of the nonprivileged
papers to the client would not create a privilege when
the client turned the papers over to his attorney.
Id. at 734-35.
'The district court's emphasis on the respondent's
attempt to thwart the government investigation was not
discussed in the court of appeals' opinion. One reason for
this may be that there is no legal precedent for analyzing the
application of the fifth amendment privilege in terms of
what the respondent's intentions were at the time he took
possession of allegedly private papers. Further, it is worth
noting that three and one half months passed between the
time the taxpayer obtained the records from his accountant
and the date the subpoena duces tecum was served on the
taxpayers' attorney. It could be argued that the taxpayer, in
transferring the records to his attorney in order to obtain
legal advice, could not have been trying to thwart the
government investigation when apparently even the Inter-
nal Revenue Service did not know that it wanted those
documents until well over four months after the initial
interview with the respondent; see United States v. Kasmir,
499 F.2d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 1974).
8United States v. Fisher, 500 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974).
'The court of appeals in Fisher evaluated the taxpayers'
possessory interest in the summoned documents to deter-
The facts of Fisher closely resemble those in
United States v. Kasmir, where the taxpayer was
informed by Special Agents of the Internal Revenue
Service that his tax returns for the past three years
were under investigation. Like the taxpayers in
Fisher, the respondent taxpayer in Kasmir retained
counsel to represent him in the investigation and
obtained from his accountant documents concerning
his tax returns. The taxpayer then immediately
transferred these documents to his attorney, Kasmir.
A subpoena duces tecum was served on the tax-
payer's accountant and attorney, ordering the at-
torney to relinquish the documents and the account-
ant to give testimony concerning them. Both appel-
lants refused to comply with the summons on the
ground that possession of the records by the tax-
payer's attorney constituted constructive possession
by the taxpayer and enforcement of the summons
would violate the taxpayer's privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination and his right to communi-
cate in confidence with his attorney. The govern-
ment then petitioned the district court for enforce-
ment of the subpoena duces tecum.
The district court granted the government's peti-
tion on the grounds that the documents belonged to
the accountant and that, at the time the summonses
were served, the taxpayer lacked a possessory interest
in the records sufficient to invoke the fifth amend-
ment privilege. The district court stayed its order
pending appeal. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals 'o removed the stay and reversed the enforce-
ment order on the basis that since the taxpayer could
have successfully asserted his fifth amendment privi-
lege if the summons had been served on him during
the time he was in actual possession of the docu-
ments, and in light of the confidential nature of the
attorney-client privilege, his protection against com-
pelled self-incrimination was not vitiated by the
transfer of the documents to his attorney. The court
mine whether the records could be considered within the
taxpayers' legitimate expectation of privacy. The court
adopted this standard from Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322 (1973), where the Supreme Court held that a fifth
amendment claim could not prevail unless the respondent
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the summoned
documents. The court of appeals concluded, "We detect
[a] 'shift in emphasis from property to privacy' in the
Court's treatment of the Fifth Amendment in compelled
production of documents." 500 F.2d at 690. Indeed, the
court found Couch as providing formal recognition for the
privacy principle as the touchstone for evaluating fifth
amendment claims against the compelled production of
documents.
"




reasoned that since the taxpayer retained a "legiti-
mate expectation of privacy" in the tax records when
he transferred them to his attorney, he retained
"constructive possession" " of the evidence and he
retained his fifth amendment protections. 2
The facts in both Fisher and Kasmir required the
courts to determine whether a subpoena duces tecum,
directing an attorney to produce documents delivered
to him by a client relying on the attorney-client
privilege, was enforceable over claims that the
documents were constitutionally protected from sum-
monses while in the hands of either the client or his
attorney. Since the Third Circuit and Fifth Circuit
decisions created a conflict in the law, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the inconsis-
tency. "
On appeal to the Supreme Court the respondents
in each case argued that enforcement of the subpoena
duces tecum would involve compulsory self-
incrimination by the taxpayers in violation of their
fifth amendment privilege. Further, the enforcement
of the summonses would constitute a seizure of
paper- in violation of fourth amendnent rights and
would violate the taxpayers' right to communicate in
confidence with their attorney. "'
In a six-to-two decision the Supreme Court
affirmed Fisher and reversed Kasmir, with Mr.
Justice White speaking for the majority in a con-
solidated opinion. "The Court ruled that the taxpay-
"
t The Court in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322
(1973) outlined the limits of constructive possession in fifth
amendment inquiries. The Court wrote:
[A]ctual possession of documents bears the most sig-
nificant relationship to Fifth Amendment protections
against governmental compulsions upon the individual
accused of crime. Yet situations may well arise where
constructive possession is so clear or the relinquish-
ment of possession is so temporary and insignificant
as to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused
substantially intact.
Id. at 333. The court of appeals in United States v. Kasmir,
following the precedent of Couch, phrased the issue before
it in terms of "whether the taxpayer has a sufficient legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the summoned records to
warrant the label of constructive possession." 499 F.2d at
452.
12499 F.2d at 453.
"Fisher v. United States, 420 U.S. 906 (1975).
"Wigmore explains:
Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, the
communications relating to that purpose, made in
confidence by the client, are at his instance perma-
nently protected from disclosure by himself or by the
legal adviser ...
8J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1940).
"
5White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Burger, CJ., and Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehn-
ers' fifth amendment privilege could not be invoked
to excuse their respective attorneys from producing
the taxpayers' records. Following a literal interpreta-
tion of the fifth amendment privilege against compul-
sory self-incrimination, 16 the Court stated that "the
Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of
'physical and moral compulsion' on the person as-
serting the privilege." "' While in both cases the
taxpayers were the accused, no information was
compelled from them by the court. Therefore the
fifth amendment privilege could not be extended to
their circumstance.
The Court analogized the fact situations in Fisher
and Kasmir to those in another recent Supreme
Court case, Couch v. United States. "8 In. Couch, an
Internal Revenue Service summons was directed to a
taxpayer's accountant for the production of business
and tax records belonging to the taxpayer but in the
possession of the accountant. The taxpayer argued
that enforcement of the summons would violate her
fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incriminaion. The Court ruled that where a taxpayer
had surrendered possession of her records to her
accountant for preparation of her tax returns there
was no personal compulsion against the taxpayer
when the accountant complied with the summons.
After all, the accountant, not the taxpayer, was the
party compelled to produce the documents. Simi-
larly, in Fisher and Kasmir, the taxpayers' attorneys,
not the taxpayers themselves, were compelled by the
subpoena duces tecum to produce the tax records.
Because the taxpayers themselves were not com-
pelled to produce anything, the Court found that they
could not call upon the fifth amendment privilege.
The Court could find no difference between the
summons of an accountant's work papers delivered to
the taxpayers' attorney and the summons of an
accountant's work papers from the accountant him-
self, since in both 'instances the records were pre-
quist, JJ.,joined. Btennan and Marshall,JJ., filed opinions
concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., took no part in the
consideration or decision of the cases.6This is contrasted with the Court's warning in 1886,
in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886), that:
[C]onstitutional provisions for the security of person
ind property should be liberally construed. A close
and literal construction deprives them of half their
efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right,
as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is
the duty of courts to be watchful for the constituional
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachment thereon.
Accord, Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967);
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
17425 U.S. at 397.
18409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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pared by and belonged to the accountant, not the
taxpayer. "
The respondents in Fisher and Kasmir argued that
Couch had carved out an exception to the require-
ment that an accused have actual possession 20 of
documents to invoke his fifth amendment privilege.
Couch suggested that situations might arise where
the transfer of documents by the accused to a third
party might be done in such strict confidence or be so
temporary that the documents would still be in the
accused's "constructive possession" "s and the per-
sonal compulsion upon him would remain substan-
tially intact. The Couch Court left unclear the
standards for "constructive possession," "only find-
"
9 In United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir.
1961), the court, in evaluating the scope of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege when a third party accountant was involved,
drew a distinction between those instances when an
accountant could invoke the attorney-client privilege to
protect information disclosed to him by the taxpayer, and
those cases where the privilege was unavailable to the
accountant.
In Kovel, an accountant appealed from a sentence for
criminal contempt for refusing to answer questions asked by
an investigating grand jury concerning one of the account-
ant's taxpayer clients. The court held that an accountant,
employed to facilitate communications between an attorney
and his client, could refuse to disclose the contents of
confidential communications on the ground that they were
protected by the attorney-client privilege..
"Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), found
that the governmental compulsion upon an accused was
greatest when that individual was forced to produce
documents that were in his actual possession. 409 U.S. at
333. Yet, actual possession alone does not establish the basis
for invoking the fifth amendment privilege. Courts have
traditionally looked to the nature and character of the
documents to determine if the fifth amendment privilege
can be invoked by the individual in possession of the docu-
ments.
In Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911), the
issue facing the Court was whether an officer of a
corporation could refuse to produce corporate documents,
held in his possession and required by a subpoena duces
tecum, on the ground that they tended to incriminate him.
The Court held that the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination did not extend to corporate documents
held by an officer of the corporation even if he himself wrote
them.
Similarly, in Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974),
the Court held that a member of a dissolved law partner-
ship, who had been subpoenaed by a grand jury to produce
the partnership's financial records, did not have access to
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
since the partnership had an institutional identity and the
petitioner held the records in a representative, not a
personal capacity. Accord, United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694 (1944).
S'See note 11 supra.
"An example of the confusion created by the ruling in
Couch that there may be situations "where constructive
ing that in this case the taxpayer had given her
records regularly to her accountant for the past
fourteen years with no legitimate expectation that
they would be privileged. The Court concluded that
where no "legitimate expectation of privacy" could
be demonstrated, a fifth amendment claim could not
prevail. "
Using the Supreme Court's analysis in Couch as a
touchstone for their argument, the attorneys in
Fisher and Kasmir contended that even though the
transfer of documents to an accountant may not
preserve the requisite possessory interest in the
records, the same is not true of transfer to an
attorney. Since a taxpayer has a sufficient "legiti-
mate expectation of privacy" in documents he trans-
fers to his attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice, "constructive possession" is established and
the fifth amendment privilege should be available.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in upholding
the respondent's fifth amendment privilege in Kas-
mir, agreed with this analysis and distinguished the
facts of Kasmir from those in Couch by suggesting
that while an accountant has a "legal duty to
disclose," an attorney has an "ethical obligation to
prevent disdisclosure." 2' In essence, the court found
that the attorney-client relationship provided the
requisite "expectation of privacy" to warrant con-
possession is so clear or the relinquishment of possession is
temporary and insignificant," 409 U.S. at 333, that the fifth
amendment privilege would still apply, can be found in In
re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
867 (1973). In Horowitz an accountant appealed an order
.refusing to quash a subpoena duces tecum requiring the
accountant to bring before a grand jury documents belong-
ing to a client but to which he had access. The government
found "Couch a ringing affirmation that the privilege
[against self-incrimination] exists only when compulsion to
produce testimony is exerted directly upon an accused."
482 F.2d at 83. The accountant, on the other hand, argued
that Couch stood for the proposition that a client who had
temporarily left documents with his accountant, with the
expectation that the records would be kept confidential, still
had constructive possession of those documents. The court,
however, held that ordering the accountant to produce
documents belonging to a client did not violate the client's
fifth amendment privilege.
"Couch v. United States 409 U.S. 322, 330 (1974).
24United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d at 453. The Ameri-
can Bar Association Canon of Ethics provides:
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101 (C), a
lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the
disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the
advantage of himself or of a third person,
unless the client consents after full dis-
closure.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics DR 4-101(B).
[Vol. 67
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structive possession by the taxpayer of the documents
in the attorney's custody.
The Supreme Court, in Fisher, rejected this
analysis, stating that the fact situations in Fisher and
Kasmir were not "one of those situations" which the
Court had in mind when it carved out the exception
to the "actual possession" requirement in Couch. 28
The Court claimed that the taxpayers in Fisher and
Kasmir were compelled to do no more than was the
taxpayer in Couch. In each case the taxpayer's rights
were the focal point of inquiry and in each case
nothing was personally compelled from the taxpayer
himself. 28 Rather, it was the accountant in Couch
and the attorneys in Fisher and Kasmir who were
required to produce the documents needed for the
government's investigation of the accused.
The Court agreed that the fifth amendment privi-
lege against compelled self-incrimination may serve
to protect personal privacy, but the Court went on to
make clear that the fifth amendment privilege was
never meant to be applied, even on the ground of
personal privacy, unless the acquisition of the evi-
dence "compelled testimonial self-incrimination." 2 7
The Court explained:
The Framers addressed the subject of personal privacy
directly in the Fourth Amendment. They struck a
balance so that when the State's reason to believe
incriminating evidence will be found becomes suffi-
ciently great, the invasion of pricacy becomes justified
28425 U.S. at 398.
261In both Couch and Fisher the Supreme Court reminds
the petitioners of Mr. Justice Holmes' maxim, "A party is
privileged from producing the evidence but not from its
production." Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458
(1913). In Couch the Court further explained:
It is important to reiterate that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is a personal privilege: it adheres basically to
the person, not to information that may incriminate
him.
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) (empha-
sis in original).
27425 U.S. at 399. Tn so ruling, the Court followed a
long history of precedent. As examples, Perlman v. United
States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), held that a petitioner could not
raise a fifth amendment challenge to enjoin the United
States Attorney from taking into his possession certain
exhibits for use in prosecution for alleged perjuries commit-
ted by the petitioner when the petitioner himself had
originally produced the documents as evidence in an earlier
infringement suit. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966), held that the taking of a blood sample from an
allegedly drunk driver, at the hospital after an accident,
and the admission into evidence at petitioner's trial of the
chemical analysis indicating intoxication did not violate
petitioner's fifth amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination.
and a warrant to search and seize will issue. They did
not seek in still another Amendment-the Fifth-to
adhere a general protection of privacy but to deal with
the more specific issue of compelled self-incrimina-
tion. 28
Having ruled that a taxpayer's fifth amendment
privilege is not violated when his attorney is com-
pelled to produce the taxpayer's records, the Court in
Fisher addressed the issue of whether the attorney-
client privilege could operate to extend the fifth
amendment privilege to documents in the hands of a
taxpayer's attorney which would have been privi-
leged in the hands of the client. The Court utilizes a
two-part analysis to resolve this issue.
First, the Court concedes that where documents
would have been privileged from production in the
hands of the client and the transfer to an attorney is
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, the attor-
ney-client privilege extends the client's fifth amend-
ment privilege to the documents while they are in the
attorney's custody. But, the argument continues, if
the documents are not privileged while in the hands
of the client, then the transfer to an attorney will not
establish a fifth amendment protection for the docu-
ments. After all, if an accused is not in a position to
invoke the protection of the fifth amendment while
the summoned evidence is in his hands, 2 the privi-
lege cannot somehow be created when the evidence is
transferred into the custody of his attorney.
Having established this groundwork, the Court
then addresses the issue of whether the documents
could have been obtained by summonses addressed to
the taxpayer while the documents were in his
possession. In answering this question the Court
adopts a technical approach to the application of the
fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. The Court's focus is on whether the
accused is compelled to give testimony that incrimi-
nates him. The Court declares that the fifth amend-
28425 U.S. at 400. The Court further emphasized the
limits of privacy interests in the application of the fifth
amendment when it wrote:
[Tihe Court has never suggested that every invasion
of privacy violates the privilege. Within the limits
imposed by the language of the FiftA Amendment,
which we necessarily observe, the privilege truly
serves privacy interests; but the Court has never on
any ground, personal privacy included, applied the
Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper
acquisition or use of evidence which, in the Court's
view, did not involve compelled testimonial self-
incrimination of some sort.
Id. at 399.28See note 20 supra.
1976]
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ment does not protect against the compelled produc-
tion of every sort of incriminating evidence, but
rather applies "only when the accused is compelled
to make a testimonial communication that is incrimi-
nating." "0 Precedent for this standard is found in
past decisions that refused to extend the protection of
the fifth amendment privilege to the admission into
evidence of blood samples, " handwriting samples, 32
voice exemplars, " and the modeling of a shirt by a
defendant. " While such evidence as blood samples or
handwriting exemplars are incriminating products of
compulsion, the fifth amendment privilege is unavail-
able to the accused since the evidence is neither the
respondent's testimony nor his personal communica-
tive writing. Similarly, the summoned records in
Fisher and Kasmir are the accountant's work papers,
not the taxpayers' communicative writings, and as
such contain no testimonial declarations by the
taxpayer. In addition, since the summoned papers
were prepared voluntarily, they cannot be said to
contain compelled " testimonial evidence.
Finding no compelled testimonial communications
in the summoned papers, the Court inquires into
what, if any, incriminating documents may be
compelled from a taxpayer by a subpoena duces
tecum. The Court suggests that if the taxpayer
himself is not compelled to give testimony concerning
the compelled records there can be no self-incrimina-
tion. The Court concedes that by complying with a
subpoena duces tecum the taxpayer is compelled
tacitly to aver that the records exist, that they are in
his possession, and that they are the ones requested
by the court. But the Court concludes that a sub-
poena duces tecum, served on a taxpayer in posses-
sion of tax records prepared by his accountant,
merely compels the taxpayer to produce work papers
that belong to his accountant. This emphasis on the
technical distinction between testimonial declara-
tions and the surrender of documents in the tax-
30425 U.S. at 408. (emphasis in original).
"Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
"Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
"United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
3 4Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
"The Court's distinction between compelled testimony
and the compelled production of information voluntarily
given is best exemplified in its decisions involving the
authorized use of electronic listening devices to record
suspect's conversations. The Court has consistently held
that if appropriate safeguards are adhered to, private
incriminating statements of an accused may be overheard
and used in evidence if they are not compelled at the time
they were uttered. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Os-
born v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
payer's possession, but owned by a third party, 36
leads the Court to write:
[Hiowever incriminating the contents of the account-
ant's work papers might be, the act of producing
them-the only thing which the taxpayer is compelled
to do-would not itself involve testimonial self-
incrimination. 3
Mr. Justice Brennan wrote a separate concurring
opinion, agreeing with the majority that the taxpayer
respondents in the Fisher and Kasmir cases could not
invoke the fifth amendment privilege against the
compelled production of the summoned documents.
But, unlike the majority, Justice Brennan reaches
this conclusion by focusing his inquiry on "the scope
of privacy that is sheltered by the [fifth amendment]
privilege."" In essence, Justice Brennan sees the
Court's decision as a "serious crippling of the
protection secured by the privilege against compelled
production of one's private books and papers." "It is
Brennan's position that ever since the 1886 case of
Boyd v. United States' the protection of personal
"See note 20 supra. The Court made especially clear, in
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), the impor-
tance of the compelled evidence being of a personal nature
for the fifth amendment privilege to attach. In White the
Court held that a union official could not refuse to produce
union records demanded in a subpoena duces tecum even
though the documents might tend to incriminate himself
both individually and as an officer of the union. The Court
wrote:
Since the privilege against self-incrimination is a
purely personal one, it cannot be utilized by or on
behalf of any organization, such as a corporation...
Moreover, the papers and effects which the privilege
protects must be the private property of the person
claiming the privilege, or at least in his possession in a
purely personal capacity.
Id. at 699.
37425 U.S. at 410-11.
"Ild. at 417 (Brennan, J., concurring). See note 56
infra.
"Id. at 414 (Brennan, J., concurring).
4"116 U.S. 616 (1886). Boyd involved a civil forfeiture
proceeding brought by the government against two busi-
ness partners for fraudulently attempting to import thirty-
five cases of foreign glass, needed in the construction of a
government building, without paying the prescribed duty.
At the trial, the government introduced into evidence an
invoice of a prior shipment of glass the partnership had re-
ceived, establishing that the partners were fraudulently
claiming a greater exemption from import duties than they
were entitled to under their contract. The defendants
objected on the ground that the use of the invoice violated
their rights under the fourth and fifth amendments since the
invoice was a "private paper" secured by a subpoena duces
tecum. The Supreme Court ruled that the invoice was
inadmissable because a defendant could not be forced to
produce evidentiary items without violating the fourth as
well as the fifth amendment.
[Vol. 67
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privacy has been a central purpose of the fifth
amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. Further, the privacy interests protect-
ed by the fifth amendment privilege extend not only
to a person's oral declarations but also to one's
testimonial materials in the forms of books and
papers. "'While the majority rules that incriminating
papers voluntarily prepared are not compelled tes-
timonial communinations for the purpose of invoking
the fifth amendment privilege, Justice Brennan
argues that voluntary preparation does not necessar-
ily exclude the availability of the fifth amendment
privilege. As Justice Brennan underscores, the fifth
amendment privilege is designed to protect "the
compelled production of testimonial evidence, not
just the compelled creation of such evidence." 42
Justice Brennan finds in the Court's recent deci-
sion of Couch v. United States' recognition for the
"zone of privacy""" as a criterion for invoking the
fifth amendment privilege against compelled produc-
tion of documents. In Couch the Court expressly held
that the fifth amendment privilege could be invoked
in connection with a subpoena duces tecum only if
the individual resisting production had a "legitimate
expectation of privacy" ' with regard to the sum-
moned evidence. By focusing on whether the accused
is compelled to make a testimonial declaration, "the
4 1425 U.S. at 418 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court
has historically extended the fifth amendment privilege to
protect an accused from compelled self-incrimination
through either testimony or his personal records. In
Ballman v. Fagan, 200 U.S. 186 (1906), the Court refused
,to enforce a subpoena, served on a defendant in an alleged
gambling scheme, requesting that the defendant appear
before the grand jury with all the books and records alleged
to have been used in the gambling scheme. The Court ruled
that a person against whom criminal proceedings are
brought is no more bound to produce records of the crime
"than to give testimony to the facts which they disclose."
Id. at 195.
In contrast, in United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694,
700-01 (1944), the Court refused to extend the protection
of the fifth amendment privilege to a union official ordered
to produce documents pertaining to union management.
4 425 U.S. at 423 (Brennan,J., concurring [emphasis in
original]).
'3409 U.S. 322 (1973).
"See note 9 supra. Although the Court, in Couch,
linked the application of the fifth amendment privilege to
whether the accused had privacy interests in the summoned
materials, it also insisted that there be some "semblance of
governmental compulsion against the person of the
accused." 409 U.S. at 336.
"
5 See note 11 supra.
"The Court writes:
The taxpayer would be no more competent to
authenticate their accountant's work papers or reports
by producing them than they would be to authenticate
Fisher majority ignores any privacy interests the
taxpayers may have had in the summoned docu-
ments, and although Justice Brennan agrees with the
majority that the fifth amendment privilege is not
available merely because the subpoena compels a
taxpayer to produce writing, books, or papers, he
insists that the threshold inquiry must still be
whether the taxpayer is compelled to produce docu-
ments in which he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
Justice Brennan suggests one criterion by which
the Court could evaluate whether the compelled evi-
dence is within the zone of privacy recognized by the
fifth amendment. In Couch the Court held that the
fifth amendment's protection was not available to an
individual who had for a number of years disclosed
information to her accountant, since there could be
no reasonable expectation of privacy in documents
left for so long a period of time with the third party.
Using this finding as a guide for recognizing privacy
interests in subpoenaed documents, Justice Brennan
finds that a relevant consideration in determining
whether an individual's documents are within the
zone of privacy is the "degree to which the paper
holder has sought to keep private the contents of the
papers he desires not to produce." "Given the facts
that each accountant in Fisher and Kasmir had full
access to the taxpayers' records, and the documents
were wholly of a business character, "'Justice Bren-
them if testifying orally. The taxpayer did not pre-
pare the papers and could not vouch for their accu-
racy.
425 U.S. at 413.
The Court recognizes that the "implicit authorization"
rationale has historically been the justification for applying
the fifth amendment's protection to documentary sum-
monses. The rationale is that the person complying with the
subpoena duces tecum implicity testifies that the documents
he is producing are in fact the ones requested. Yet the
Court leaves unclear whether it is accepting the "implicit
authorization" rationale or now discarding it in Fisher.
The Court agrees that the elements of compulsion are
present in the Fisher case because
compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the
existence of the papers demanded and their possession
or control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the
taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in
the subpoena.
Id. at 410. Yet the Court implies that this apparently im-
plicit authorization does not itself establish the testimonial
self-incrimination required for prqper application of the
fifth amendment.
"
7 Id. at 411 (Brennan,J., concurring).
"'In Fisher the husband taxpayer's checks and deposit
receipts related to his textile waste business. The wife's
receipts related to her women's wear shop. In Kasmir the
books and records requested by the documentary summons
concerned the taxpayer's large medical practice.
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nan concurs with the majority's enforcement of the
subpoenas because the documents failed to come
within the zone of privacy recognized by the fifth
amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination.
The majority justifies its departure from the Boyd
privacy criterion by suggesting that the Boyd holding
was founded on the premise that an accused could not
be compelled to produce mere evidentiary"9 items
without violating both the fifth amendment and the
fourth amendment. The Court interprets Boyd's
standard for invoking the fifth amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination as hinged upon
fourth amendment search and seizure violations.
Boyd ruled that the government could not seize
personal papers as evidence unless it could claim a
possessory interest in the property superior to that of
the person from whom the property was obtained.
Further, a defendant could not be forced to produce
purely evidentiary items because the seizure of purely
evidentiary materials violated the fourth amendment,
and the fifth amendment rendered these seized
materials inadmissible. But the Fisher majority finds
the Boyd criterion for invoking the fifth amendment
privilege inconsistent with such recent search and
seizure rulings as those permitting the seizure of
purely evidentiary materials, " testimonial evidence,
"Prior to Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the
Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment prohibited
the seizure of "mere evidence," that is, items that are
neither contraband, fruits or instrumentalities of the crime,
or weapons which the suspect might use to make an escape.
See note 50 infra. This limitation upon the seizure power
rested upon the assumption that the right to search for and
seize property depended upon the state's assertion of a
claim to possession of the property superior to that of the
accused. The Court held that the state's interest in using the
seized property to secure a conviction of the accused was not
an interest superior to the accused's ownership or posses-
sory rights. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the
government brought an action against two partners for
fraudently attempting to import glass without paying the
prescribed duty. The government obtained a summons
directing the partners to produce an invoice the partnership
had received concerning a prior glass shipment. This
invoice was admitted at trial to establish that the partners
had fraudulently claimed a greater duty exemption than
they were entitled to. The Supreme Court reversed the
judgment in favor of the government on the ground that the
government could not seize an accused's documents or other
property as evidence unless it could claim a proprietary
interest in the property superior to that of the person from
whom the property is obtained. 116 U.S. at 622.5 In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the Court
rejected the distinction prohibiting the seizure of merely
evidential materials seized either under the authority of a
and conversations of criminal suspects. "' To the
extent that the Boyd rule against the compelled
prodluction of private papers rested on the proposi-
tion that the government seizure of mere evidence,
including documents, violated both the fourth and
fifth amendments, the Courts finds Boyd no longer
relevant. The Court makes clear that the protection
of personal privacy is a mere by-product of the fifth
amendment privilege, not a test for invoking the
privilege:
[T]he Court has never suggested that every invasion
of privacy violates the privilege. Within the limits
imposed by the language of the Fifth Amendment,
which we necessarily observe, the privilege truly serves
privacy interests; but the Court has never on any
ground, personal privacy included applied the Fifth
Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper acquisi-
tion or use of evidence which, in the Court's view, did
not involve compelled testimonial self-incrimination of
some sort. 52
Respondents in Fisher argued that because an
attorney is legally and ethically required to respect
the confidences of his client, a taxpayer has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the records he
transfers to his attorney in order to obtain legal
advice. By transferring the records to his attorney he
does not forfeit his fifth amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. The Court agrees with
respondents that if the fifth amendment would excuse
a taxpayer in possession of the accountant's papers
from compliance with the subpoena, the taxpayer's
privilege would extend to the attorney to whom the
records were delivered for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice. But, at the same time, if the documents
could have been summoned from the taxpayer him-
self while he was in possession of them, then they
can also be summoned from the attorney following
the transfer by the client in order to obtain legal
advice. " The Court's focus remains on the tax-
payer, not on the attorney and not on any rights or
privileges that allegedly arose out of the transfer of
records to an attorney. Since "enforcement against
search warrant or during the course of a search incident to
an arrest, and allowing for the seizure of instrumentalities
and fruits of a crime and contraband. In Warden the Court
permkaed the government to enter into evidence clothing
belonging to the accused that had been seized by police
during a search incident to arrest.
5 See note 35 supra.
"2425 U.S. at 399; see also In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72,
85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973).
13425 U.S. at 397.
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a taxpayer's lawyer would not 'compel' the taxpayer
to do anything-and certainly could not compel him
to be a 'witness' against himself," "'the fifth amend-
ment privilege will not attach, regardless of the
privacy expectations the taxpayer may have had
when he turned the records over to his attorney.
By so holding the Court leaves in doubt the role of
privacy interests in future fifth amendment consider-
ations and firmly establishes the technical criteria for
invoking the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. While Justice Brennan contends that
privacy considerations provide the touchstone against
which to judge the availability of the fifth amend-
ment privilege, the majority suggests that the proper
method of judging whether an accused is compelled
to give incriminating testimony rests on previous
rulings that the privilege is not available simply
because the evidence which the accused is required to
produce contains incriminating writing. " However,
the Court's analysis of the role of privacy interests in
the application of the fifth amendment can be
criticized for being inconsistent with recent Supreme
Court decisions that have involved privacy principles
arising under the fifth amendment."
"Id. (emphasis added).
"Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913). See
note 26 supra.
"To better understand the origins of the role of privacy
interests as a criterion for invoking the fifth amendment
privilege one must first turn to Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886). The Court in Fisher appears to be correct
in saying that Boyd's holding (that the seizure of a man's
private books and papers to be used in evidence against him
violates his fifth amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination) relies on the initial finding that the search
and seizure in that case was an unreasonable one in
violation of the fourth amendment.
But the Court inaccurately implies that fifth amendment
privacy principles, recognized by Boyd and its progeny in
prohibiting the compelled production of private papers,
must rely on a fourth amendment violation as well in order
to be involved. In 1944, fifty-eight years after Boyd was
decided, the Court referred to privacy principles protected
by the fifth amendment in Feldman v. United States, 322
U.S. 487 (1944). In Feldman the Court held that the fifth
amendment does not forbid the use against a defendant in a
criminal case being heard in federal court evidence of
self-incriminating testimony previously compelled under a
state immunity statute in a state court. The Court wrote:
We are immediately concerned with the Fourth and
Fifth Amendment, intertwined as they are, and
expressing as they do supplementing phases of the
same constitutional purpose-to maintain inviolate
large areas of personal privacy.
Id. at 489-90.
In 1964, in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm., 378 U.S. 52
(1964), the Court admitted that one of the basic values re-
flected in the fifth amendment is a respect for every indi-
The Fisher Court's focus on the testimonial
elements of production rather than on the nature and
content of the compelled evidence leaves unsettled the
question of whether the fifth amendment privilege
can ever be invoked to suppress private papers seized
by the government pursuant to a valid subpoena
duces tecum and offered into evidence at trial.
It is important to the majority's position in Fisher
that the summoned documents are the accountant's
work papers and, though prepared from information
supplied by the taxpayer, they hevertheless belong to
the accountant. "One can ask, however, whether the
fifth amendment would shield the taxpayer from
compulsion to produce his own tax records in his
vidual's right "to a private enclave where he may lead a
personal life." 378 U.S. at 55. In Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court found that a state statute
making it a crime for any person to use contraceptives
violated the rights of marital privacy found within the pe-
numbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. The
Court stated that:
Various [constitutional] guarantees create zones of
privacy... The Fifth Amendment in its Self-In-
crimination Clause enables the citizen to create a
zone of privacy which government may not force him
to surrender to his detriment.
Id. at 484.
Just two years ago the Supreme Court, in Bellis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974), while recognizing that
the protection of individual privacy was the major theme
running through the Court's decision in Boyd, held that the
fifth amendment privilege was not available to a member of
a dissolved law partnership who had been subpoenaed by a
grand jury to produced the partnership's financial records
since the lawyer held the records in a representative, not a
personal capacity. In Bellis the Court discussed the prin-
ciples of Boyd entirely in terms of the protections the fifth
amendment provides against the compelled production of
one's personal papers. The Court had no problem inter-
preting Boyd as holding that
any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own
testimony or of his private papers to be used as
evidence to convict him of crime would violate the
Fifth Amendment privilege.
Id. at 87. Indeed, the Court, in Bellis, unlike the Court in
Fisher, did not distinguish Boyd on the ground that the
privacy principles protected by the fifth amendment are
tied up in the fourth amendment search and seizure viola-
tions that occurred in Boyd. Rather, the Bellis Court
distinguished Boyd on the basis of the fact that the lawyer
seeking to invoke his fifth amendment privilege in order to
quash the subpoena duces tecum lacked the requisite
"personal" interest in the partnership's books. Id. at 88.
"
7 These same considerations were important to the
Court's analysis in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322
(1973). Justice Brennan, on the other hand, contends in his
concurring opinion in Fisher that "[wihere one's private
documents would tend to incriminate him, the privilege
exists although they were actually written by another
person." 425 U.S. at 428 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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possession. The Court expressly reserves this ques-
tion for a case involving the private records of a
taxpayer, "8 yet it leaves clues throughout the Fisher
opinion that the impact of the Fisher ruling is not to
be restricted to documents prepared by a third party
accountant:
The fact that the documents may have been written
by the person asserting the privilege is insufficient to
trigger the privilege. . . . And, unless the Govern-
ment has compelled the subpoenaed person to write
the document . . . the fact that it was written by him is
not controlling with respect to the Fifth Amendment
issues. "
The Court's analysis seems to limit the scope of
the fifth amendment privilege to situations where the
government either compels the subpoenaed defendant
to give incriminating oral testimony or compels him
to write incriminating testimonial declarations. "0 In
essence, any voluntary preparation of papers and
records, whether prepared by the defendant himself
or by a third party, can be summoned without
violating the defendant's fifth amendment right
against compulsory self-incrimination. The logic of
the majority opinion demands this conclusion
because there can be no rational basis for distinguish-
ing between defendants who have a third party
prepare such papers for them and those defendants
who prepare the same records and fill out the same
forms themselves.
But if tax records prepared by a taxpayer himself
are not protected by the fifth amendment because the
actual writing of the papers is not compelled by the
government, then one must wonder what protections
are left for such personal effects as one's private
correspondences and diary. 6 They too have not been
'8425 U.S. at 414.5 1d. at 410 n.11; see also Wilson v. United States,
221 U.S. 361 (1911); cf. Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62
(1968).
6 The Court writes that
however incriminating the contents of the account-
ant's work papers might be, the act of producing
them-the only thing which the taxpayer is compelled
to do-would not itself involve testimonial self-
incrimination.
425 U.S. at 411.
"
1The Court has recently suggested that there may be
limits to the government's power to compel the production
of private papers by a documentary summons. In Andresen
v. Maryland, 96 S.Ct. 2737 (1976), the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the introduction into evidence
of a defendant's business records, seized pursuant to a war-
rant during a search of his office, violates the fifth amend-
compelled by the government to be written. They too
require the defendant to do no more than- "surren-
der" them pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum. The
Fisher Court's rejection of privacy principles as a
criterion for evaluating the scope of the fifth amend-
ment privilege surely suggests that letters and diaries
are not protected by the fifth amendment privilege.
It is possible that the above extension of the Fisher
decision goes too far. The Court may have meant to
limit the scope of its decision by suggesting that a
taxpayer might be complied to incriminate himself if
he had to authenticate the summoned papers, that is
"to restate, repeat or affirm the truth of the contents
of the documents sought." " In Fisher, since the
summoned papers belonged to the accountant, only
the accountant could testify to the authenticity of the
records and other documents. The taxpayers "did
not prepare the papers and could not vouch for their
accuracy." 63
In United States v. Miller64 the Supreme Court
again reviewed privacy interests arising under a
challenge to a subpoena duces tecum. But in Miller
the Court discussed privacy interests arising under a
fourth amendment challenge to the court summons.
In Miller the Court ruled that a defendant in a
criminal hearing had no protectable fourth amend-
ment interest to suppress bank records maintained
pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.85
Respondent was charged with conspiracy to defraud
ment. The Court found that since the records were volun-
tarily prepared without governmental compulsion, and
since the petitioner did not have to authenticate the records
(a handwriting expert authenticated the records) the peti-
tioner was not forced to testimonially incriminate himself
in violation of the fifth amendment.
The Court, however, was careful to distinguish between
searches for records pursuant to a warrant or incident to an
arrest, and the compelled production of documents from an
individual in compliance with a documentary summons.
".1d. at 409; accord, United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694, 698 (1944).
63425 U.S. at 413. See note 46 supra.
64425 U.S. 435 (1976).
"
5Section 1839b (d) of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970
provides:
Reproduction of checks, drafts, and other instruments;
record of transactions; identity of party
(d) Each insured bank shall make, to the extent that
the regulations of the Secretary so require-
(1) a microfilm or other reproduction of each
check, draft, or similar instrument drawn on it
and presented to it for payment; and
(2) a record of each check, draft, or similar
instrument received by it for deposit or collec-
tion, together with an identification of the party
for whose account it is to be deposited or
collected, unless the bank has already made a
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the government of tax revenues by the manufacture
and possession of distilled spirits without proper
registration or licensing. Prior to trial the respondent
moved to suppress copies of bank records that had
been obtained by means of an allegedly defective
subpoena duces tecum 6 served upon two banks
where the respondent had accounts. The records had
been maintained by the banks in compliance with the
requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. The
subpoenas required the bank presidents to produce
all of the respondent's bank records. Neither bank
informed the respondent that the subpoena had been
served and in each case the bank made the respond-
ent's relevant bank records available to the investi-
gating agents.
The respondent contended that the bank records
were illegally seized because the subpoenas duces
tecum were defective. The district court overruled
the respondent's motion to suppress and the bank
records were admitted into evidence at the trial. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 6 ' reversed on the
ground that bank records obtained by means of a
defective subpoena constituted an unlawful invasion
of a bank customer's privacy, in violation of his
fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the government contended that the court of
appeals had erred in finding that the respondent had
the requisite fourth amendment interest in the
records to challenge the validity of the subpoena
duces tecum. 6
In California Bankers Association v. Schultz "the
Court held that the recordkeeping requirements of
the Bank Secrecy Act were constitutional on their
face and that the mere maintenance of records
record of the party's identity pursuant to subsec-
tion (c) of this section.
12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (1970).
"The petitioner argued that the subpoenas were defec-
tive because they were "issued by the United States
Attorney rather than by the court, because no return was
made upon the subpoenas to the court, and because the
subpoenas were issued for a date when the grand jury was
not in session." United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751, 756
(5th Cir. 1974).
6 United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974).
"The government also contended that the court of
appeals erred in holding that the subpoenas were defective
and in determining that suppression of the evidence was the
appropriate remedy if a constitutional violation did take
place. Since the Supreme Court held that the respondent
had no protectable fourth amendment interest to challenge
the subpoena in the first place, it did not reach the
government's two latter contentions.
69416 U.S. 21 (1974).
pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act did not violate
depositors' fourth amendment rights, since neither
the Act itself nor its implementing regulations
required that any of the information contained in the
bank records be disclosed to the government. Gov-
ernment access to the depositors' bank records was
"controlled by existing legal process." " The
respondent in Miller, however, contended that while
a depositor may have no fourth amendment interest
in the bank records so long as they are merely
retained in compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act,
once the government issues a subpoena duces tecum
to obtain the bank depositor's records a fourth
amendment interest is created. This interest arises as
a result of the bank depositor's legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy " in the bank records, in that the rec-
7 California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 52
(1974). Although the Court in California Bankers never
defined the term "existing legal process," at least one court
assumed that "legal process" referred to valid subpoenas
issued either by a court or an investigating grand jury. In
United States v. Sahley, 526 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1976), the
defendant was tried and convicted of the charge that he had
made a material false financial statement to a federally in-
sured bank for the purpose of influencing the bank to ap-
prove a loan submitted by him. The defendant, appealing
on the ground that the grand jury subpoena for his financial
statement was issued without probable cause, relied on the
court of appeals' decision in Miller. The court in Sahley,
however, distinguished Miller on the basis that Miller stood
for the proposition that a grand jury subpoena issued by a
United States Attorney for a date when the grand jury was
not in session did not constitute "legal process" within the
meaning of California Bankers. In contrast, the court found
that since the defendant's bank records in Sahley were
subpoenaed by a grand jury in session they were obtained
by the government "by way of bona fide 'existing legal
process."' Id. at 916.
"'The Court relied on Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293 (1966), to support its use of the "zone of privacy" test.
In Hoffa the defendant made incriminating statements to a
paid informer that Hoffa had invited into his hotel room.
The Court found that the accused's fourth amendment
rights were not violated by admitting the informer's
testimony into evidence since the defendant had not relied
on the privacy of his hotel room in speaking with the
informer. Rather, he had relied on the misplaced confidence
that the informer would not reveal the defendant's wrong-
doing. See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971), wherein the Court expressed the view that:
Our problem is not what the privacy expectations of
particular defendants in particular situations may be
or the extent to which they may in fact have relied on
the discretion of their companions. . . .Our problem
... is what expectations of privacy are constitution-
ally "justifiable"-what expectations the Fourth
Amendment will protect in the absence of a warrant.
Id. at 751-52.
Some courts, in analyzing a defendant's privacy interests,
1976]
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ords kept by the bank are merely copies of the re-
spondent's personal records and they are made
available to the bank for the limited purpose of con-
ducting financial transactions. The respondent
argued that to permit the government to obtain these
records by way of a defective subpoena duces tecum
circumvents the depositor's fourth amendment rights
by allowing the government to seize the depositor's
bank records without complying with the legal
process that the government would have had to in-
voke if it had proceeded directly against the de-
positor.
The Supreme Court, in seven-to-two decision72
with Mr. Justice Powell writing for the majority,
ruled that since the subpoenaed documents were not
the respondent's private papers, but rather were the
bank's records, the documents failed to fall within a
constitutionally protected zone of privacy and the
respondent lacked an interest protected by the fourth
amendment. Consequently, the case was governed by
the rule that the issuance of a subpoena to a third
party to obtain documents belonging to that party
does not violate the fourth amendment rights of the
person under investigation. 7'
have tried to distinguish between the disclosure of such
private transactions as those involving checks and drafts and
disclosure of records maintained by banks for internal
recordkeeping purposes. See United States v. Ginsburg, 376
F. Supp. 714 (D. Conn. 1974). In contrast, the dissenting
opinion in the petition for rehearing on behalf of the
government in United States v. Miller, 508 F.2d 588 (5th
Cir. 1975), expressed the belief that the Bank Secrecy Act
effectively decreased any reasonable expectation of privacy
in the bank records
because the records are now required to be maintained
by statute, whereas prior to the passage of the Act
microfilms were kept at the business discretion of
banks, and customers were not informed of the
practices of their own bank, or of other banks involved
in the collecting process.
Id. at 591.
"Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Burger, C.J., and Stewart, White, Blackmun, Rehnquist,
and Stevens, JJ., joined. Brennan and Marshall, JJ., filed
separate dissenting opinions.
"In Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1970),
an Internal Revenue Service agent investigating the tax-
payer petitioner's tax returns, issued summonses to the tax-
payer's putative former employer and its accountant for the
production of the employer's records of the taxpayer;s
employment and compensation during the years under
investigation. When the taxpayer received a temporary
restraining order from the district court, restraining the
employer and its accountant from complying with the
summons, the government filed petitions for enforcement of
the summons pursuant to sections 7402(b) and 7604(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code. See note 3 supra. The taxpayer
filed a motion to intervene in the enforcement proceeding,
The Court recognized that Boyd v. United States 74
prohibits the "compulsory production of a man's
private papers to establish a criminal charge against
him." But the Court distinguished Boyd on the
ground that the documents subpoenaed in Miller
were not the respondent's private papers, but were
the business records of the banks. The respondent
neither owned nor possessed the bank records main-
tained pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act. The Court
found support for this proposition in California
Bankers, 75 where bank depositors challenged the
record keeping requirements of the Bank Secrecy
Act on the ground that the Act allowed the govern-
ment to preserve and collect evidence of criminal
activities through an unconstitutional search and
seizure. The Court decided, however, that the de-
positor's claim was premature because the Act
merely required the bank to maintain records of
financial transactions with customers, and any gov-
ernmental access to the records was still be be con-
trolled by existing legal process. 76 The Court re-
jected the argument that the bank, as a neutral party
to the recording of financial transactions, was seiz-
ing records as an agent of the government, on the
ground that the banks are parties that not only earn
a portion of their income from conducting such trans-
actions, but also have a substantial interest in the
records' continued availability and use. The Court
advised that "[c]laims of depositors against the com-
pulsion by lawful process of bank records involving
the depositors' own transactions must wait until such
process issues." "
The Miller Court could have addressed the issue,
left unresolved in California Bankers, of whether
bank records seized by government investigators
without a valid subpoena duces tecum could be
relying on Rule 24 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See note 4 supra. The district court denied the
taxpayer's motion, with the court of appeals and the United
States Supreme Court affirming the ruling. The Supreme
Court ruled that an Internal Revenue Service summons
could be used in connection with a tax investigation so long
as the summons was issued in good faith and prior to a
recommendation for prosecution. 400 U.S. at 536. In
addition, the Court held that a party that had no proprie-
tary interest in the summoned records had no protectable
interest in the documents and consequently no absolute
right under Rule 24 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to intervene in an Internal Revenue Service
summons enforcement proceeding. 400 U.S. at 528.
7*116 U.S. 616 (1886). See note 39 supra.






suppressed at trial on the basis of a violation of the
bank customer's fourth amendment rights. But the
Miller Court, instead of analyzing the legal process
invoked by the government to obtain the respondent's
records, chose to rest on the notion that the banks are
active and interested parties in the financial transac-
tions carried on between them and their customers,
and concluded that the subpoenaed materials were
the business records of the banks, not the customer's
private papers. Unable to assert either ownership or
possession of the records, the respondent had no
fourth amendment interest in the documents and thus
he lacked standing to contest the validity of the
government's subpoenas duces tecum to the banks.
The Court then addressed respondent's argument
that the compulsion which required the production of
his bank records itself creates a fourth amendment
interest in the documents. To resolve this issue the
Court directed its attention to the nature of the
summoned documents, asking whether the respond-
ent had a "legitimate expectation of privacy" "
concerning their contents. The Court concluded that
since all of the summoned documents either con-
tained information voluntarily transferred to the
banks and exposed to the bank employees during the
ordinary course of business or were negotiable
instruments expected to be used in commercial
transactions, the respondent could have no legitimate
expectation of privacy in their contents. The Court's
decision makes clear that a bank depositor acts at his
own risk in transacting financial affairs with a
bank. " The fourth amendment cannot be used to
prevent government authorities' use of information
obtained from third parties, even if the information is
revealed to the government on the assumption that it
will be kept in strict confidence. 80 In summary,
"
8See note 71 supra.
"It may be that even if the Court, in Miller, had decided
that the respondent did have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his bank transactions, and that the proper legal
process had not been adhered to, the bank customer still
might not be able to protect his bank records from seizure
by the government for purposes of an investigation. In
United States v. Prevatt, 526 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1976), the
same circuit court of appeals that ruled that legal process
had been insufficient in United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d
751 (5th Cir. 1974), ruled that where a bank voluntarily
turned its records over to the Internal Revenue Service the
defendant could not maintain a motion to suppress those
bank records from evidence at trial. The court ruled that
"the bank's consent vitiates any requirement of compulsory
legal process." 562 F.2d at 403. Contra, Burrows. v.
Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 245, 529 P.2d 590, 594,
118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 170 (1974).
J0425 U.S. at 443.
because the respondent could have no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the bank records, he lacked
the requisite fourth amendment interest in the
documents to challenge the validity of the subpoenas
duces tecum.
Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Miller, also
focuses on whether the respondent's right of privacy
was invaded. But unlike the majority, Justice Bren-
nan concludes that the respondent had privacy
interests in the bank documents that satisfied the
threshold requirements for invoking a fourth amend-
ment claim. Justice Brennan adopts the language of a
recent California Supreme Court case, decided on a
factual situation similar to Miller. In Burrows v.
Superior Court, 81 the California Supreme Court
held that a bank customer had a legitimate expecta-
tion that, unless required by legal process, his bank
records would be privately kept by the bank for
internal purposes only. " Therefore, the acquisition
of the bank records by investigating officers with-
out utilization of proper legal process constituted an
illegal search and seizure in violation of the fourth
amendment. 83
Justice Brennan, employing the words of Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Burrows, responds to the
majority's assertion in Miller that the bank records
of depositors are business records in which the bank
holds an ownership interest. Justice Brennan attacks
this notion by distinguishing between the role of the
bank as a mere recordkeeper and its position when it
becomes a victim of the depositor's criminal acts. He
argues that so long as the bank remains a neutral
party without a significant interest in the matter
under investigation, the bank may not consent to an
invasion of the depositor's right of privacy. Justice
Brennan reminds the Court that it is, after all, the
depositor's privacy interests that are at issue, not the
bank's. 84 However, he continues, where the bank is
no longer a neutral party to the matter under
investigation, but is rather a victim of the depositor's
wrongdoing, then the depositor's right of privacy
8113 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166
(1974). In Burrows polite contacted several banks at which
the accused, an attorney suspected of having misappropri-
ated funds belonging to a client, maintained accounts.
Without a warrant or any court process copies of the
accused's financial statements were obtained from at least
one bank. The court held that the bink statements relating
to the accused's bank accounts and obtained without the
benefit of legal process were acquired as a result of an illegal
search and seizure.821d. at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 169.31d. at 245, 529 P.2d at 595, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
8'425 U.S. at 450 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
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cannot prevail. 85 In Miller, the bank was a neutral
party. It had no knowledge of the respondent's
allegedly illegal acivites and was not harmed thereby.
Justice Brennan suggests that the decision in
Miller places individuals and businesses in an ines-
capable bind. For practical purposes they must
maintain bank accounts in order to fully participate
in the economic life of contemporary society. Yet in
Miller a legislative scheme is affirmed whereby the
government has been allowed to "circumvent the
Fourth Amendment by first requiring banks to copy
their depositors' checks and then calling upon the
banks to allow inspection of those copies without
appropriate legal process." 8"
Mr. Justice Marshall, also dissenting in Miller,
laments the majority's two-step approach to the
Bank Secrecy Act's recordkeeping requirements and
the government's acquisition of records maintained
pursuant to the Act. Justice Marshall points out that
in California Bankers the Court held that the
depositor plaintiffs in that case lacked standing to
challenge the reporting regulations of the Bank
Secrecy Act because they failed to allege a threatened
or actual injury resulting from the reporting require-
ments. In Miller, the Court now suggests that once a
bank has complied with the requirements of the Act
the customer has no standing to invoke the fourth
amendment when the government requests his rec-
ords from the bank. The depositor's bank records
belong to the bank the moment he undertakes a
transaction with the bank, and he can have no
legitimate expectation of privacy in them. There is a
Catch-22 quality to the majority's holding that the
respondent depositor's claim comes too late. Even
though forced to let the bank make records of all of
his transactions with it, the depositor still loses any
protectable fourth amendment interest in those docu-
ments as soon as he turns them over to the bank.
Justice Marshall writes:
By accepting the Government's bifurcated approach
to the record-keeping requirement and the acquisition
85An example of a factual situation in which the
depositor's right of privacy could not prevail, using Justice
Brennan's analysis, is United States v. Sahley, 526 F.2d
913 (5th Cir. 1976). In Sahley the defendant was charged
with making a material false financial statement to a
federally insured bank for the purpose of influencing the
bank to approve a loan submitted by him. Although the
court addressed the issue of whether the grand jury
subpoena complied with legal process, Brennan's position
in his dissent in Miller would suggest that the depositor's
right to privacy would not have been violated even if the
bank had merely volunteered the' depositor's financial
statement to the government authorities.86425 U.S. at 453 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
of records, the majority engages in a hollow charade
whereby Fourth Amendment claims are to be labeled
premature until such time as they can be deemed too
late. "
The Court's decision in Miller is a disturbing
precedent in that it can be interpreted to sanction a
governmental scheme for bypassing citizens' fourth
amendment rights and protections by first requiring
a third party bank to keep records of all of its
customers' financial transactions and then, without
invocation of the proper legal process, allowing the
government to enter the bank to inspect and repro-
duce those records in the furtherance of a criminal
investigation. The potential for abuse in such a
scheme is particularly acute in light of the fact that
Miller seems to permit access to the recorded
information without invocation of the judicial process
at all. Although California Bankers limited govern-
ment access to records maintained by banks pursuant
to the Bank Secrecy Act by requiring the invocation
of existing legal process, 88 the Court's decision in
Miller leaves unclear who, in anyone, can challenge
the government's methods for seizing a depositor's
bank records. As Justice Marshall points out in his
dissentng opinion, while the depositor has no stand-
ing to challenge the maintenance of his bank records
pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act before the govern-
ment subpoenas his records (because he could chal-
lenge no injury due to the mere recordkeeping
requirements of the Act), once those records are
maintained and subpoenaed, the depositor has no
standing to challenge their production (because the
records belong to the bank and the depositor lacks
any fourth amendment privacy interests in them).
The Court, however, never does state who, then,
can challenge the validity of a subpoena duces tecum
issued to a bank for a depositer's bank records. The
depositor, after Miller, is effectively precluded from
ever challenging a summons for his bank records. By
the Court's analysis, only the bank is the proper
party to challenge the defectiveness of the summons.
After all, according to the Court, the records belong
to the bank and the bank is an interested party in
those records. However, it would be a most rare bank
that would attempt to interfere with a government
investigation of a depositor by refusing to comply
with an allegedly defective subpoena duces tecum. As
Justice Brennan contended, unless a depositor
perpetrates a wrongdoing against the bank itself,
the bank remains a neutral party to the government
87425 U.S. at 455 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88416 U.S. at 52.
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investigation with no significant interest in the
privacy rights of the depositor. "9 It is worth bearing in
mind Justice Brennan's reminder that it is the
privacy interests and rights of the depositer that are
at stake, not those of the bank.
One can ask, then, just what does the Court mean
in California Bankers when it refers to "existing
legal process". " The Bank Secrecy Act provides no
clues because it is noticeably silent on what legal
process the Secretary of the Treasury must follow to
obtain depositers' records from banks keeping the
records in compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act. In
Stark v. Connally, " the case that on appeal to the
Supreme Court took on the title California Bankers
Association v. Schultz, the District Court found that
the Bank Secrecy Act
makes no provision for any summons, either judicial
or administrative, as the means whereby the Secretary
can demand reports from banks and their customers
concerning the details of their financial transactions.
He is empowered to preemptorily require such reports
routinely-automatically-from the banks and from
all parties and participants in financial transactions
without any procedure whereby either the bank or the
customer may in advance test the reasonableness of the
demand. "
The Bank Secrecy Act, " then, contains no judicial
"
9See note 85 supra.
"'416 U.S. at 52.
91347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. California Bankers Ass'n v.
Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). The court phrased the issue
before it in terms of
whether these provisions [in the Bank Secrecy Act],
broadly authorizing an executive agency of govern-
ment to require financial institutions and parties to or
participants in transactions with them, to routinely
report to it, without previous judicial or administra-
tive summons, subpoena or warrant, the detail of
almost every conceivable financial transaction as a
surveillance device for the discovery of possible wrong-
doing on the part of bank customers, is such an
invasion of a citizen's right of privacy as amounts to





9 The Bank Secrecy Act can be contrasted to the
Internal Revenue Act of 1954, which establishes procedures
whereunder the Secretary of the Treasury, for the limited
purpose of ascertaining the correctness of an individual's
tax return, may summon the person liable or any person
having possession or care of books of account relating to the
business of that person or any other person to appear and to
produce such records and to give testimony as may be
relevant to such an inquiry. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §
7602. See note 2 supra. Under these procedures the
safeguards for the uncontrolled government intrusion
into one's records kept by banks pursuant to the
Bank Secrecy Act. After California Bankers one
could have surmised that the existing legal process
available to government investigators included the
use of valid administrative summonses or judicial
subpoenas with the ultimate enforcement of the
summons judicially controlled by the bank or by the
customer depositor acting as an intervening third
party interest whose financial transaction are
involved. "'
Yet, by refusing to grant the depositor standing to
challenge the subpoena duces tecum, the Miller
Court denies the depositor the access to the very legal
process it guaranteed in California Bankers. The
Court reassures the depositer that his fourth amend-
ment rights are going to be protected anyway because
the government's power to obtain his records does
not represent the kind of unreviewed executive
discretion that necessarily interferes with one's per-
sonal affairs. The Court must realize, however, that
it walks a thin line when it finds that the investigative
needs of the government outweigh the privacy
considerations of the bank customer because it vainly
attempts to allay the fears and anxieties bound to be
aroused by its decision when it rationalizes that the
Bank Secrecy Act is nothing more than a means for
implementing a longstanding law enforcement tech-
nique.
ultimate enforcement of the summons rests with the
judiciary since either the bank or the customer taxpayer
himself, as an intervening third party interest whose
financial transactions are involved, may challenge the
summons. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 7604. See note 3
sup ra.
It is fair to suggest that the government itself recognized
that the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 contained no precedural
safeguards with respect to the reporting of domestic
financial transactions. The government wrote, in its brief to
the district court in Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242
(N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
California Bankers Ass'n. v. Schultz 416 U.S. 21 (1974):
Nothing in the [Bank Secrecy Act] gives the govern-
ment any greater right to access to bank records than
it possessed before. Consequently, whenever the fed-
eral government desired to inspect any bank records
kept under the provisions of the new statute, the
federal government must resort to using an adminis-
trative summons or judicial subpoena as it did in the
past. Upon the issuance of such a summons or
subpoena, if the bank customer felt that the use of the
summons or subpoena constituted an illegal search
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, that
contention could be contested in court in the same
manner as it heretofore has been contested.
Id. at 1251.
"
t See note 4 supra.
5 The Court writes that the Bank Secrecy Act is
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The Court in Miller, never squarely focuses on the
bank customer's right to privacy which is threatened
by the disclosure of his records to investigating gov-
ernment officials. Indeed, the Court leaves unclear
whether it ever will discuss that issue, for as long as
not a novel means designed to circumvent established
Fourth Amendment rights. It is merely an attempt to
facilitate the use of a proper and longstanding law
enforcement technique by insuring that records are
available when they are needed.
425 U.S. at 444.
a depositor lacks standing to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the Bank Secrecy Act both before records
are kept and after the records are copied and pos-
sessed by the bank, the customer may find that the
only alternative method for preserving the privacy of
his financial records is to avoid transacting business
with a bank at all. This is hardly a realistic alterna-
tive, and yet the Court's decision in Miller effectively
shuts out the only other method for insuring against
unrestrained governmental intrusion into the bank
customer's financial background and status.
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